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Presale: Deutsche Postbank AG (Covered Bonds)
Primary Credit Analyst:
Swetlana Ziggel, Frankfurt (49) 69-33-999-248;
swetlana_ziggel@standardandpoors.com
Surveillance Credit Analyst:
Christina Scheibli, Frankfurt (49) 69-33-999-313;
christina_scheibli@standardandpoors.com
Additional Contact:
Structured Finance Europe;
StructuredFinanceEurope@standardandpoors.com
Publication date: 01-Jul-2009
Reprinted from RatingsDirect



Up To �?�1 Billion �?ffentliche Pfandbriefe/Legislation-Enabled Public Sector Covered Bonds

This presale report is based on information as of July 1, 2009. The ratings shown are preliminary. This report does not constitute a recommendation to buy, hold, or sell securities. Subsequent information may result in the assignment of final ratings that differ from the preliminary ratings.

Description of the notes  Prelim. credit rating*  Preliminary amount  Available credit support (%)  Legal final maturity  
German public sector covered bonds (�?ffentliche Pfandbriefe) AAA Up to �?�1 billion Dynamic (see "Structural Enhancements") According to terms and conditions of the notes
*The rating is preliminary as of July 1, 2009, and subject to change at any time. An initial credit rating is expected to be assigned on the closing date. Standard & Poor's ratings address timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal according to the original terms and conditions.

Program Participants
Issuer Deutsche Postbank AG
Trustee Heinz Eberhardt, and Dr. Wilhelm Schopen as deputy


Program Summary

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has assigned a preliminary credit rating to the inaugural �?ffentlicher Pfandbrief (German legislation-enabled public sector covered bonds) issuance to be drawn under Deutsche Postbank AG's (Postbank) �?�15 billion debt issuance program.

Depending on market conditions, the first issuance of public sector covered bonds is expected in the third quarter of 2009. According to their terms and conditions, the public sector covered bonds will constitute senior secured unsubordinated obligations and will rank pari passu among themselves and, for public sector bonds, at least pari passu with other obligations of the issuer under public sector covered bonds. The notes and all other documentation relating to the program are governed by German law.

If used by Postbank (A-/Positive/A-2), the asset composition of the �?�1.8 billion public sector cover pool would in our view be unique: nearly half of the cover pool will comprise residential mortgage loans that, as we understand, became eligible for inclusion in the cover pool under the German Covered Bond Act (PfandBG) via an unconditional guarantee by a 'AAA' rated public-sector entity. Based on the documentation reviewed by us the guarantee payments cover all losses on these mortgage loans. We expect the other half to comprise public sector European sovereign bonds and German federal state bonds. We understand that the public sector covered bond will comply with the German Covered Bond Act (PfandBG).

From a credit risk perspective leaving aside the guarantee for mortgage loans we see no rating-relevant difference (i.e., low average loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, high seasoning, or high proportion of owner-occupied properties) between these loans and those that were used to cover Postbank's Hypothekenpfandbriefe issued in February 2008 (see "New Issue: Deutsche Postbank AG�??Hypothekenpfandbrief" in "Related Research"). We understand that primarily documentary requirements (e.g., current onsite visits of the properties for the valuation) imposed by the PfandBG, and low average sizes of collateral loans did not allow the bank to use this mortgage collateral for its Hypothekenpfandbrief (German legislation-enabled mortgage covered bonds).

Postbank still has some public sector covered bonds outstanding that were issued by DSL Bank (a public sector entity, owned since 2000 by Postbank). These bonds were issued according to former �?ffentliches Pfandbriefgesetz, and there are no further issuances. Since the DSL acquisition in 2000, Postbank issued another covered bond type that was introduced in the course of DSL Bank's privatization (according to paragraph 7 of the DSL Bank Transformation Act; DSL Bank is not rated). We understand that these DSL covered bonds were mainly issued as private placements to domestic institutional investors.


Strengths, Concerns, And Mitigating Factors


Strengths

  • Credit risk: We consider the creditworthiness of the rated notes to be supported by the granularity of the underlying residential, primarily owner-occupied mortgage loans portfolio (15,846 loans), its seasoning (weighted average seasoning of 10.1 years), the apparent lack of unexpected geographic concentrations (highest concentration is 29.6% in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia), and the LTV ratios (weighted average LTV ratio is 50.3%). We note that the pool's performance (repayment of interest and principal) is further enhanced by a guarantee from a 'AAA' rated public sector entity for each mortgage loan included. We expect the initial public sector part of the cover pool to comprise five European sovereign bonds, three German federal state bonds, and one German Landesbank bond.
  • Market risk: We see interest rate risk as limited because most cover assets, as well as the expected issuance, pay at fixed rates. There is currently no foreign exchange risk, as both assets and liabilities are euro-denominated.
  • Overcollateralization: We consider the current overcollateralization to be well above the regulatory minimum level of 2% on a net present value (NPV) basis. Including the maximum amount of �?�1.0 billion as the inaugural issuance, we expect Postbank's current cover pool of �?� 1.8 billion to provide an overcollateralization of 83.3% (nominal).
  • The German covered bond legislation supports, in our view, our assignment of ratings predominantly based on the strength of the cover pool with limited reliance on the issuing bank.

Concerns

  • Credit risk: The dynamic nature of the cover pool may result in a change in the composition and credit quality of the cover pool assets. Provided the eligibility criteria according to the PfandBG are met, Postbank has the ability, in principle, to include other eligible assets without the investors' consent. Credit characteristics and price volatility of those cover assets may differ from the current composition.
  • Market risk: Currently, Postbank has stated that it does not intend to use derivatives to mitigate market risks, but rather intends to rely on natural hedging or overcollateralization to mitigate these risks.
  • Liquidity risk: We think that uneven maturity profiles between cover assets and intended covered bond maturities, as well as limited secondary market liquidity for most cover assets, might lead to reliance on substitute assets and the monetization of cover assets, which may not always be possible.
  • Risk of an early termination of the guarantee by Postbank: We assume that cancellation of the guarantee for mortgage assets shortly before a potential Postbank insolvency would result in the ineligibility of mortgage cover assets (mortgage assets represent currently half of the cover pool) and the bank might not be able to replenish this part of the cover pool. Correspondingly, if already in default, the assets will likely remain�??even without the guarantee�??part of the cover pool. However, we think secondary market prices of unsecured collateral may be lower than those of a portfolio benefiting from a guarantee. Additionally, there may be defaults of the underlying mortgage assets that only arise after such early termination and are therefore not covered by the guarantee.
  • Guarantee payments: The amount covered by the guarantee, according to its terms, is the realized loss for the defaulted loan. The realized loss will be paid only at the end of the recovery process, which we expect to take up to 2.5 years, and we therefore consider that this could lead to a liquidity shortfall.
  • Overcollateralization: Although Postbank has stated its intention to provide more than the regulatory required minimum overcollateralization, we understand that investors cannot rely on a legally binding commitment to provide more overcollateralization than required by the PfandBG, nor any legal obligation or commitment to always maintain the current rating (which may require more overcollateralization than the 2% required by German law). We therefore assume the overcollateralization that currently supports the assigned ratings could, at management discretion, decline to the sole regulatory minimum, which may not always be sufficient to support the current ratings.

Mitigating factors

  • Credit risk: We assume that the cover pool will be monitored regularly, the issuer does currently not intend to materially change the asset quality of the cover pool, and all nonperforming mortgage loans will be taken out of the cover pool as long Postbank is solvent.
  • Market risk: We currently expect neither interest nor foreign exchange risks to change materially, and we therefore expect the market risk to remain limited. Thus, we expect the collateralization to provide a sufficient buffer for those risks. In addition, Postbank must by law comply with the market risk stresses as stipulated by the PfandBG. With most cover assets granted at fixed rates, and covered bonds issued against also expected to be at fixed interest rates, interest rate risk will likely remain limited. With the current absence of foreign exchange risk, we consider that overcollateralization will provide a rating-commensurate buffer for the observed risks.
  • Liquidity risk: With increased issuances, we assume Postbank will establish a more matched funding profile. To maintain the currently assigned ratings, we assume the bank will provide sufficient amounts of liquid assets to allow for timely payment of principal and interest during the 180 days following a potential issuer insolvency. In the absence of other structural features, this will, in our opinion, provide a time buffer and allow for the monetization of cover assets if needed.
  • Risk of an early termination of the guarantee by Postbank on or after April 2013: In our view, the current portfolio exhibits high credit quality even without the guarantee. In an additional scenario analysis, we have addressed the risk that defaults may occur to a large extent directly after the first optional termination date. We will monitor Postbank's ability to add further eligible assets to the cover pool, particularly in advance of a potential cancellation.
  • Guarantee payments: In our analysis we take into account the expected time of the guarantee payments for the realized loss. In our cash flow analysis this is the same approach as for the simulation of the recovery period.
  • Overcollateralization: We intend to regularly discuss with the issuer its willingness to maintain the current target rating and the level of overcollateralization. Currently, we understand that the issuer intends to maintain the current target rating level. Furthermore, we consider that Postbank has the ability and willingness to maintain the mortgage and public sector businesses and to provide a rating-commensurate level of overcollateralization over and above the regulatory requirements, aimed at ensuring the long-term stability of the covered bonds' creditworthiness. We will continuously monitor the credit rating on Postbank.

Covered Bond Program Structure

According to Postbank, its current public sector cover pool of �?�1.8 billion will comprise approximately 50% residential mortgage loans, which are eligible as a result of a guarantee by a public sector entity attached to individual loans. The remainder will comprise secondary-market-sourced European public sector bonds (see chart 1).

We expect Postbank to issue up to �?�1 billion as a jumbo public sector covered bond. The maturity of the covered bonds is expected to be between three and five years. We understand that liabilities will pay a fixed rate and that redemption will be specified as bullet, and that the date of issuance, maturity, and interest rate will depend on market conditions.

image
Public sector entity guarantee

According to the information we have reviewed, a 'AAA' rated public sector entity will enter into a guarantee agreement with Postbank, under which it will guarantee to pay the realized loss for the mortgage loans registered in the cover pool. The guarantee is a final guarantee that pays at the end of the recovery process for each mortgage loan included in the cover pool. We understand that the mortgage loans have become eligible through the public sector guarantee.

We also understand that the mortgage loans singled out as collateral for the public sector cover pool are part of a reference pool for a synthetic residential mortgage-backed securities transaction (using the Provide framework).

Eligibility of assets. We expect all residential mortgage loans used as cover pool assets to be fully guaranteed by Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW; AAA/Stable/A-1+), and therefore to be eligible for inclusion in a public sector covered bond. KfW is a public sector institution to which a state refinancing guarantee applies according to paragraph 1a of KfW law. We assume that according to this, in the case of KfW's insolvency, the Federal Republic of Germany would cover all of KfW's obligations.

Guarantee payment. On the basis of the guarantee agreement, Postbank has a direct claim against the public sector guarantor. It must, upon each allocation of realized loss, pay Postbank (or the Sachwalter in case of Postbank's insolvency) the amount of that realized loss at the end of the recovery process, which we expect to take up to 2.5 years (see "Assumptions: German Law Change Affects Mortgage Foreclosure Period Stresses" in "Related Research"). Realized loss is defined as the outstanding nominal amount of defaulted mortgage loans, the accrued interest, and the related enforcement costs. A special trustee must confirm the amount of that realized loss before it is allocated.

The guarantor's obligations are unrelated to Postbank's performance, including the payment of fixed-rate fees to the guarantor. Also, it is not contractually allowed to set off any of the claims against other obligations or to exercise any retention rights.

Guarantee duration. The guarantee agreement states that it may not be terminated by the guarantor for any reason. The stated expiry date of the agreement is January 2057.

Termination option. Postbank is granted the right to terminate the guarantee agreement on each fixed-rate payment date with at least 20 business days' prior written notice to the guarantor specifying the reasons. The reasons for the optional termination by Postbank are stated to be certain regulatory events, such as change of applicable laws.

Postbank may also terminate the agreement, according to its terms, on or after April 2013, or after any event as a result of which the bank guarantee no longer qualifies as a public sector guarantee under paragraph 1 No. 2 of the PfandBG.

Postbank insolvency. The fulfillment of guarantee payments by the guarantor is stated to be irrespective of Postbank's insolvency. In insolvency, the dedicated cover pool administrator ("Sachwalter"), and thus we assume the cover pool, becomes the beneficiary of the guarantee agreement.

If the underlying loans are sold by the Sachwalter, the guarantee will remain attached according to its terms. Further fungibility will be limited, as the guarantee only allows a sale to a maximum of two German banks that are allowed to issue Pfandbriefe.

We understand that a sale of assets without the guarantee and to other institutions than Pfandbriefbanks is also possible, but as this would result in smaller revenues, we would not expect the Sachwalter to do so in the first case.

If Postbank adds further residential mortgage assets to the current cover pool going forward, all new assets need to be secured by a new guarantee. This implies to us that, in case of pool growth, new guarantees will also be added.

We will review the terms of the new guarantees each time new mortgage assets are added to the cover pool.

The agreement also provides that in the case of Postbank's insolvency, the liquidator of the bank assets would not have the right to terminate the guarantee.

Furthermore, the future fees payable for the guarantee will be collateralized according to the agreement on the closing of the program.

As the calculation and the amount of the fixed-rate payments to the guarantor are a part of a separate bilateral agreement between Postbank and the guarantee is not a subject to set-off, we do not expect the guarantor to enforce any claims against the Sachwalter in Postbank's insolvency.


Structural Enhancements


Overcollateralization

In addition to the compulsory nominal matching requirements (covering principal and interest), German covered bond issuers must by law also maintain a minimum overcollateralization of 2% on an NPV basis at all times.

Including the maximum amount of �?�1 billion as inaugural issuance, we expect Postbank's cover pool to provide an overcollateralization of 83.3% (nominal). Given the expected growth, we think the current levels might not be representative for the future. Furthermore, we consider that while the PfandBG provides certain restrictions on market risk and requires that any shortfall when performing the mandatory stress tests must be buffered with additional overcollateralization, satisfying the mandatory regulatory overcollateralization requirements is typically not sufficient to support the highest ratings. We consider that Postbank is currently able and willing to provide levels commensurate with the target rating. However, we note that without contractual obligations, maintenance of this voluntary overcollateralization remains at management discretion, which can be exercised at short notice. We therefore consider a regular review of the issuer's ability and willingness to maintain these levels to be important.


The cover register

For each of its different covered bonds, Postbank must by law maintain independent cover pools. There will be no cross-collateralization between those cover pools. If the issuer became insolvent, potential excess of cover assets after each cover pool's wind-down would become available for unsecured creditors. Claims of other covered bond creditors, provided they are not fully covered by the respective cover pool, would then rank pari passu with the unsecured creditors.

In Germany, the cover register is maintained by an independent trustee whose duties include ensuring compliance with the PfandBG, and any addition/removal from the cover pool is only legally binding with its consent. Also, the trustee must review whether the regulatory required stress-testing is performed and that the matching requirements are always fulfilled.

We understand that, typically, Postbank's internal auditors perform regular checks and balances as to whether the PfandBG's eligibility and risk management requirements are adhered to. Furthermore, we note that the German banking supervisors (BAFin) regularly perform an external audit on the cover register and the respective regulatory requirements.


Set-off risk

While Postbank is a deposit-taking institution, we believe the PfandBG and related laws provide rating-commensurate comfort that the covered bonds cannot be subject to set-off risk.


Commingling risk

In our opinion, the PfandBG and related laws also provide rating-commensurate comfort that the covered bonds cannot be subject to credit losses arising from commingling risk (i.e., the risk that amounts paid in respect of the loans in the cover register are commingled with other assets belonging to the issuing bank and part of the bank's insolvent estate in case of insolvency).

In addition, we consider that borrowers could delay the payments to the defaulted bank or the transfer of the cover assets to a new servicer or to the insolvent bank's successor could delay payments under the loans of the cover pool assets. We consider these risks as short-term liquidity risks which are addressed by the provision of respective amounts of liquid assets to allow for timely payment of principal and interest during the 180 days following a potential issuer insolvency, which is monitored quarterly. In addition, as we assume that the asset transfer would only be subject to the notification of borrowers and a potential change of the account number, we would not expect any relevant delay.


Cover Pool At Program Set-Up Date

Postbank's current �?�1.8 billion public sector cover pool comprises approximately one half residential mortgage loans guaranteed by a public sector entity, and the other half European public sector bonds, according to the information we have reviewed.


Mortgage Loan Underwriting Process

We have reviewed Postbank's mortgage loan underwriting process recently for its Hypothekenpfandbrief rating evaluation and summarized it in the according presale (see "New Issue: Deutsche Postbank AG�??Hypothekenpfandbrief" in "Related Research").


Property Valuation

We have reviewed Postbank's property valuation process recently for its Hypothekenpfandbrief rating evaluation and summarized it in the according presale (see "New Issue: Deutsche Postbank AG�??Hypothekenpfandbrief" in "Related Research").


Arrears Process

We have reviewed Postbank's arrears process recently for its Hypothekenpfandbrief rating evaluation and summarized it in the according presale (see "New Issue: Deutsche Postbank AG�??Hypothekenpfandbrief" in "Related Research").

We will repeat such reviews on a regular basis.


Residential mortgage loans

Based on the information received by Postbank, all loans are guaranteed by a public sector entity, and as such we understand them to be eligible for inclusion in the public sector cover pool. We understand that the mortgage loan portfolio was originated in Germany by Postbank/DSL or BHW Bausparkasse AG, Hameln, a subsidiary of Postbank.

We consider the current pool of residential mortgage loans to be very granular relative to other pools we have reviewed, comprising 15,846 loans that exhibit a relatively low average exposure size of �?�63,169. We note that the preliminary pool does not comprise loans in excess of �?�400,000 (see table 1).

Table 1 Key Features Of The Guaranteed Mortgage Part Of The Cover Pool as of Jan. 31, 2009*
Collateral description 100% residential mortgage loans
Country of origin Germany
Number of loans 15,846
Largest loan 392,420
Average loan 63,169
Weighted-average loan to value (%) 50.3
Geographic concentration within Germany North Rhine-Westphalia: 29.6%; Eastern Germany (without Berlin): 17.6%
Weighted-average seasoning 120 months/10.1 years
Interest-only loans (%) 57.5
Letting loans (%) 14.6
Self-employed (%) 2.9
Arrears No�??according to Postbank all loans in arrears will be removed from the cover pool
*Note that the information provided in table 1 and in the following charts is based on the pool cut as of the end of January 2009. The total principal balance reduced to �?�933 million as of May 31, 2009, due to the amortization of underlying loans. According to stratified data as of May 31, there were no major changes to the figures presented above.

The weighted-average LTV ratio for the mortgage part of the cover pool is 50.3%, and only 27.7% of the loans have an LTV ratio higher than 60% (see chart 2).

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The pool shows a weighted-average seasoning of 10.1 years (see chart 3).

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Relative to other cover pools we have reviewed, we believe the cover pool is well diversified across Germany. With 29.6% of cover assets (measured by principal amount outstanding; see chart 4), the largest concentration by geographic area is in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). Being the most populous state in Germany, we do not see this concentration as a negative factor for the pool's creditworthiness, and consider it about average compared with the population distribution in Germany. The exposure in Eastern Germany (excluding the State of Berlin), representing 17.6% of loans by principal balance outstanding, is regarded as relatively modest.

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We see the underlying assets as highly granular relative to other cover pools we have reviewed, with loans smaller than �?�200,000 comprising over 96.2% of the total cover pool. No loans are higher than �?�400,000.

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Public sector bonds

This part comprises the following five European sovereign bonds (with a current minimum rating of 'A+'), three German federal state bonds, and one Landesbank bond�??each having a share of approximately 5.6% in the total cover pool (see table 2). The weighted-average rating on the public sector part is 'AA', and the weighted-average maturity is 6.98 years�??each as calculated by us based on the information provided by the bank, or according to the bank.

Table 2 Description
Name  Coupon (%)  Maturity  Volume (mil. �?�) 
Belgium 4.25 September 2014 100
Spain 4.40 January 2015 100
France 3.00 October 2015 100
Ireland 4.50 April 2020 100
Italy 3.75 August 2015 100
Mecklenburg Vorpommern Floating May 2011 100
Schleswig-Holstein 3.375 January 2013 100
NRW 3.55 April 2015 100
Landesbank Baden Wuerttemberg 3.75 April 2015 100
Total �?? �?? 900


Hedging Structure

The matching requirements of the PfandBG also prescribe that certain stress tests must be performed and that an adequate risk management on a cover pool basis must be in place. Rather than use derivatives, Postbank has stated its intent to hedge within the allowed market risk limits by way of natural hedging. As most of the mortgage loans are granted at fixed rates, we believe that exposure to interest rate risks will remain manageable, as the covered bonds that will be issued against, are also expected to be issued as fixed-rate-paying bonds. Currently, Postbank only intends to issue euro-denominated covered bonds and, and within the allowed market risk limits, primarily to rely on natural hedging, rather than on using derivatives. We stress-test the cash flows to form an opinion on whether market risks are addressed to a level commensurate with a target rating.


Credit Analysis

The preliminary 'AAA' rating assigned to the covered bonds reflects our opinion that the cover pool backing the bonds is such that these can withstand credit losses in the cover pool associated with this rating level. It also reflects our view on the ability of the cash flows from the assets to meet the debt service requirements on the liabilities so that timely interest and full principal are repaid on the scheduled maturity of the covered bonds. We analyze the collateral quality to form a view on the expected loss in a stressed situation.

Our credit analysis for the European bonds in the cover pool included an exposure review of underlying bonds to estimate the credit risk of each individual exposure. Together with correlation assumptions of the assets and recovery assumptions, we generated a default probability for the target rating. We then used the derived default probability and recovery assumption as the input for the cash flow analysis.

For the mortgage assets, we analyze the collateral quality to form a view on the expected loss in a stressed situation. Cash flow shortfalls in the collateral would mainly result, we think, from asset quality problems, i.e., credit losses on the respective mortgage loans that would reduce the amounts available to service the secured debt. The 'AAA' preliminary rating assumes that credit enhancement will be provided for the issued covered bonds, which is typical for covered bond programs. This credit enhancement is usually achieved through overcollateralization.

The credit analysis on the mortgage loans involves assessing the individual credit quality of the cover pool by estimating the credit risk associated with each mortgage loan. We then calculate the aggregated risk is to form a view on the overall credit quality of the cover pool. We quantify the credit risk associated with each mortgage loan in the pool by estimating each loan's probability of default leading to a portfolio-wide weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and its corresponding weighted-average loss severity (WALS), which we expect to be realized if foreclosure occurs. We calculate the expected loss associated with a loan by multiplying the foreclosure frequency with the loss severity. To quantify the expected losses associated with the entire cover pool, we weight each mortgage loan's foreclosure frequency and loss severity by its percentage of the total cover pool. Please see table 3 for further details.

Table 3 Portfolio WAFF And WALS*
Rating level  WAFF (%)  WALS (%)  Credit cover (%) 
AAA 14.1 8.1 1.14
*Please note that the calculated figures are based on a pool cut as presented above, as of Jan. 31, 2009.

We used the probability of default (WAFF) and the recovery assumption of 100% (giving full benefit to the guarantee) in the cash flow model to determine the level of overcollateralization considered commensurate with the 'AAA' rating.


Scenario Analyses

For this covered bond credit analysis we modeled two scenarios.

The first scenario gives no benefit to the guarantee. We input the WAFF and the stressed expected recovery (the inverse of the WALS in table 3 above) into the cash flow model to determine the level of overcollateralization considered to be commensurate with a preliminary 'AAA' rating. We concluded that the current overcollateralization addresses the amount of realized losses and resulting liquidity stresses.

In the second scenario we have addressed the risk that defaults may occur to a large extent directly after the first optional termination date of the guarantee. In this analysis we assumed a five-year backloaded default pattern, thus starting defaults in year one and applying defaults over five years, with most defaults occurring in year five. Additionally, we assumed that the recovery rate after the optional termination date of the guarantee is equal to the stressed expected recovery (the inverse of the WALS in table 3). We concluded that the current overcollateralization addresses the amount of realized losses occurring after the first optional termination date and resulting liquidity stresses.


Cash Flow Analysis

We consider that with the expected issuance of a jumbo bullet maturity up to five years, the bank will introduce a cash flow mismatch between constantly amortizing loans and a single-bullet maturity. Over time, however, the cash flow profile is expected to become more balanced, and the bank is expected to be able to include highly liquid assets to facilitate the illiquidity management of the pool on a stand-alone basis. In our preliminary cash flow analysis we assumed the maximum issuance amount of �?� 1 billion.

In a run-down scenario, the amortization of the cover pool ends with the maturity of the last asset in 2024 (see chart 6).

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All assets and liabilities cash flows are euro-denominated, so that currently there is no currency risk. Interest rates for assets are fixed, and covered bonds are set at fixed rates.

We generally evaluate a pool of covered bonds on a cash flow basis to form an opinion on whether, under conditions of severe economic stress, the cash flow generated by the assets would be sufficient to meet the timely debt service payments due on the liabilities. The aim of the cash flow analysis is to assess the pools with regard to:

  • Credit risk as described above;
  • Market risk in the form of interest rate and eventual currency risk;
  • Liquidity risk as a result of cash flow mismatches between assets and liabilities in terms of maturity;
  • Prepayment risks and servicing costs; and
  • A stress-testing of these risks using the Covered Bond Monitor (CBM).

CBM is a Monte Carlo model, which simulates approximately 100,000 different economic scenarios, or more if required, to establish a default distribution. Each scenario produces a different path for interest rates and exchange rates for each currency included in the issuer's cover pool. Using these input parameters, a corresponding set of cash flows is computed to determine whether the pool exhibits sufficient strength under these stressed assumptions to pass the target rating eligibility test. The average maturity of outstanding covered bonds defines the target rating default probability against which the cash flows are benchmarked. Generally, if the respective cover pool cash flows exhibit fewer defaults than accepted under the threshold, the cover pool passes the rating eligibility test from a quantitative point of view.

The cash flow analysis is based on the assumption of a static pool�??i.e., no active pool management or new issues other than servicing the liabilities as they come due and, if necessary, taking out bridge financing to cover temporary liquidity needs. This assumption stems in turn from our central rating assumption, where the issuer is insolvent and the pool is managed until it has fully amortized.


Liquidity Analysis

As a result of the typical uneven maturity profiles between cover assets and outstanding covered bonds, we stress the liquidity costs in our cash flow analysis. In a situation where the program has excess cash, we assume that the proceeds can be invested at the then-simulated market rates. The PfandBG allows the special receiver-in-bankruptcy (Sachwalter) to refinance maturing covered bonds by selling assets or taking out bridge loans.

In the rating scenario, we assume that the issuer is insolvent and cannot manage liquidity as previously. Therefore, we assume that the Sachwalter would be able to invest excess cash at a discount of 50 basis points (bps) to the then-simulated interest rate.

In a situation where insufficient proceeds have been accumulated before upcoming maturities, we assume that the trustee can take out a bridge loan. Because of the distressed situation, we assume that in the 'AAA' scenario, the pool must be able to service the simulated rates plus a premium of 100 bps.

In addition, to maintain the currently assigned ratings, we assume the bank will always provide sufficient amounts of liquid assets to allow for timely payment of principal and interest during the 180 days following a potential issuer insolvency. In the absence of other structural features, we think this provides a time buffer, and should allow for the monetization of cover assets, if needed. While the 180-day rule has been introduced into the PfandBG, compliance with that rule will only become mandatory in November 2009.

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Issuer Summary

On June 26, 2009, we affirmed our 'A-/A-2' counterparty credit ratings on Postbank, and our 'BBB+/A-2' counterparty credit ratings on Postbank's 100%-owned strategically important subsidiary, BHW. The outlook on both entities remains positive. At the same time, we lowered our ratings on Postbank's hybrid capital securities to 'BB' from 'BB+.'

Our ratings affirmation reflects our view that Postbank continues to benefit from its relatively reliable retail business model and franchise as Germany's largest private-sector retail bank. Postbank continues to demonstrate a strong, granular retail funding position, which remains a particular rating strength against the ongoing global liquidity squeeze. Moreover, its granular and highly collateralized retail lending structure should restrict credit losses to manageable levels overall.

Despite our affirmation, we are mindful that the elements contributing to our ratings assessment have changed. We lowered by one notch our appraisal of Postbank's stand-alone credit quality to reflect Postbank's weak capitalization and financial flexibility and bleak earnings prospects in difficult markets. At the same time, we incorporated a one-notch uplift for implicit government support. Postbank has not yet applied for support from the German government's Financial Markets Stabilization Fund. However, we believe it would receive government support, if necessary, because of its high systemic importance in Germany, owing to its size, large retail deposits and operations, and capital market activities.

The downgrade of Postbank's hybrid capital securities reflects Postbank's weakened stand-alone financial profile and our base-case assumption that the bank could incur further cumulative losses in 2009�??2011, in light of our negative economic forecasts and unstable financial markets.

We remain concerned, however, about potential pressure on Postbank's already low 6.1% regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (including market risk), despite beneficial Basel II treatments, and the potential volatility of this ratio because of the market-sensitivity of some components of Postbank's equity. This ratio compares with our estimate of a regulatory 4.5% ratio, based on Basel I on March 31, 2009. However, we expect Postbank's risk-adjusted capital ratio under our new framework to be much lower, underlining Postbank's remaining impairment risks from low quality in �?�6.5 billion of structured credit investments; higher risk charges for its cyclical and less seasoned commercial real estate financings, particularly development loans; and bulk risk from larger corporate financings. Moreover, our adjusted total capital figure is 10% lower than Postbank's regulatory Tier 1 capital. This difference did not result from our new methodology, but because we continue to deduct goodwill and intangibles, which are sizable, and continue to limit perpetual hybrid instruments to 33% of adjusted common equity.

Our ratings on Postbank do not yet benefit from implicit ownership support from Deutsche Bank AG (A+/Stable/A-1). This is because arrangements between Deutsche Bank and Postbank's 37% shareholder, Deutsche Post AG (BBB+/Negative/A-2), afford Deutsche Bank significant flexibility as to whether, and when, it will proceed to majority ownership by early 2012.

In the event of a capital increase at Postbank, both Deutsche Bank and Deutsche Post are obliged to participate on a pro rata basis to prevent dilution of their stakes and to protect their investment. (See "Deutsche Postbank AG" and "Deutsche Postbank 'A-/A-2' And BHW Bausparkasse 'BBB+/A-2' Ratings Affirmed; Outlooks Positive; Hybrids Cut To 'BB' in "Related Research".)


Legal Framework

The German Covered Bond Act (PfandBG) and the respective secondary legislation provide the legal framework for the issuance of covered bonds in Germany.

In our analysis of the legal framework, we reviewed the legal issues that we deem key for our delinked rating approach:

  • The isolation of and priority to the assets in the cover pool on the issuer's insolvency;
  • No acceleration or forced restructuring of debt on the issuer's insolvency;
  • The survival of the hedging agreements on the issuer's insolvency;
  • The capacity for a manager to generate liquidity to mitigate any maturity mismatch risk between the assets and the liabilities; and
  • The ability to provide and maintain overcollateralization over and above the regulatory minimum requirements if the issuer becomes insolvent.

The PfandBG defines eligibility criteria for the type of assets (public sector assets, or mortgage- or shipping-secured loans) that may and may not be included in the cover pool. For each distinct asset type, the issuer must maintain a segregated cover pool and the respective matching and management requirements must be performed on a per-pool basis. Furthermore, a covered bond issuer must disclose key risk indicators at least quarterly for each cover pool (composition of the cover pool by certain standardized criteria, overcollateralization based on a nominal and an NPV basis before and after stress, etc.).

If Postbank becomes insolvent, the PfandBG provides that covered bondholders will have a preferential claim on the proceeds arising from the cover assets. Based on our analysis of the law, we assume that German covered bonds do not automatically accelerate if the issuer becomes insolvent. While the trustee's role is to continue to ensure adherence to the PfandBG in all material aspects, the dedicated cover pool manager ("Sachwalter") is to take over the cover pool management. The Sachwalter must manage the cover pool to ensure timely payment of interest and principal for the covered bonds. According to the law, he is entitled to take appropriate measures to raise liquidity by selling or borrowing against cover pool assets to repay covered bonds becoming due, and generally must act in the bondholders' interest to avoid becoming personally liable. Expenses for the Sachwalter and the trustee must be borne by the cover pool and are senior to the covered bondholders.


Ongoing Surveillance

We will maintain regular surveillance on Postbank's public sector covered bonds until the notes mature or are otherwise redeemed. We will:

  • Analyze reports(which we expect to receive regularly) detailing the quality and performance of the underlying collateral;
  • Simulate the potential market risk to determine whether currently provided levels of overcollateralization are sufficient, in our opinion, to mitigate the stresses at a level commensurate with the target rating;
  • Monitor supporting ratings; and
  • Make regular contact with the issuer to form a view on whether servicing standards are sustained and to analyze the bank's ability and willingness to maintain overcollateralization at a level considered commensurate with the target rating.

Additionally, as this is a new program, for each new covered bonds issuance we will review whether the overcollateralization levels remain commensurate, in our opinion, with the then-current rating on the program.


Related Research

  • Standard & Poor's Ratingansatz fuer Covered Bonds und Pfandbriefe (published on www.standardandpoors.com)
  • Expanding European Covered Bond Universe Puts Spotlight on Key Analytics (published on July 16, 2004)
  • Assumptions: German Law Change Affects Mortgage Foreclosure Period Stresses (published on Nov. 28, 2008)
  • Germany Farewells Mortgage Bank Act For New Covered Bond Act To Take Center Stage (published on May 21, 2005)
  • All Covered Bonds Are Not Created Equal (published on Sept. 13, 2007)
  • Methodology & Assumptions: Applying The Derivative Counterparty Framework To Covered Bonds (published on Feb. 26, 2008)
  • New Issue: Deutsche Postbank AG�??Hypothekenpfandbrief (published on Feb. 21, 2008)
  • Deutsche Postbank AG (counterparty credit analysis, published on Dec. 13, 2007)
  • Deutsche Postbank 'A-/A-2' And BHW Bausparkasse 'BBB+/A-2' Ratings Affirmed; Outlooks Positive; Hybrids Cut To 'BB' (published on June 26, 2009)

Related articles are available on RatingsDirect. Criteria, presales, servicer evaluations, and ratings information can also be found on Standard & Poor's Web site at www.standardandpoors.com. Alternatively, call one of the following Standard & Poor's numbers: Client Support Europe (44) 20-7176-7176; London Press Office (44) 20-7176-3605; Paris (33) 1-4420-6708; Frankfurt (49) 69-33-999-225; Stockholm (46) 8-440-5914; or Moscow (7) 495-783-4011.