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U.S. RMBS Surveillance & CDO Of ABS Assumptions Revised Amid Defaults,Negative Housing Outlook

Publication Date:    Jan 15, 2008 15:46 EST

U.S. RMBS Surveillance & CDO Of ABS Assumptions Revised Amid Defaults,Negative Housing Outlook
Primary Credit Analysts:
Ernestine Warner, New York (1) 212-438-2633;
ernestine_warner@standardandpoors.com
Andrew J Giudici, New York (1) 212-438-1659;
andrew_giudici@standardandpoors.com
Robert B Pollsen, New York (1) 212-438-2577;
robert_pollsen@standardandpoors.com
Secondary Credit Analyst:
Stephen Anderberg, New York (1) 212-438-8991;
stephen_anderberg@standardandpoors.com
U.S. RMBS Practice Leader:
Susan E Barnes, New York (1) 212-438-2394;
susan_barnes@standardandpoors.com
Global Practice Leader - ABS/RMBS Ratings:
Rosario Buendia, New York (1) 212-438-2410;
rosario_buendia@standardandpoors.com
Global Practice Leader SF Surveillance:
Peter D'Erchia, New York (1) 212-438-2438;
peter_derchia@standardandpoors.com
Global Practice Leader CDOs:
Patrice Jordan, New York (1) 212-438-2501;
pat_jordan@standardandpoors.com
Chief Quality Officer-SF Ratings:
Thomas G Gillis, New York (1) 212-438-2468;
tom_gillis@standardandpoors.com
Media Contact:
Adam M Tempkin, New York (1) 212-438-7530;
adam_tempkin@standardandpoors.com
Publication date: 15-Jan-08, 15:46:41 EST
Reprinted from RatingsDirect


NEW YORK (Standard & Poor's) Jan. 15, 2008--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services 
today announced that it has revised the assumptions it uses for the 
surveillance of U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), and that 
the correlation and recovery assumptions used to rate and monitor 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions backed by U.S. RMBS are in 
the process of being revised.

We have made three fundamental changes to our surveillance assumptions for 
U.S. RMBS.
     1.) We extended our stresses of the expected loss amount over the 
lifetime of the transactions (compared with the 36-month period we currently 
use) to evaluate the adequacy of credit enhancement. Because we expect the 
duration of the housing downturn to be longer than previously anticipated, we 
believe that using a longer term and corresponding revisions to loss curves 
may be appropriate.
     2.) We revised our expected losses for the 2006 vintage subprime 
collateral to 19% from 14%, as delinquencies continue to rise, and we will 
recalculate lifetime loss expectations for all vintages of U.S. RMBS. 
Additional losses are projected to result directly for the additional 
delinquencies and defaults.
     3.) We revised our assumptions on availability of excess spread, as the 
increased number of loan modifications will likely reduce future excess spread 
available to cover credit losses.  These assumptions are consistent with 
scenarios recently published in ?Reviewing The Impact Of Rate Freezes On Rated 
U.S. First-Lien Subprime RMBS Under Two Scenarios,? which was published on 
Dec. 21, 2007.
 
These revisions reflect the growing economic consensus that U.S. home price 
declines will be larger than previously forecasted and that the slump in the 
U.S. housing market is expected to last far longer than previously 
anticipated. These factors, combined with the persistence of significant 
growth in seriously delinquent borrowers, are leading to upward revisions in 
loss expectations and greater likelihood that these expectations will be 
realized. Loan modifications appear to be gaining traction in the industry, 
increasing the likelihood that excess interest in the affected securitizations 
will decline and reduce credit enhancement to cover losses.

At the CDO level, we are reviewing the correlation and recovery assumptions we 
use for U.S. RMBS securities held within CDO collateral pools. Existing CDO of 
ABS transactions with exposure to U.S. RMBS securities could be affected by 
these changes in CDO assumptions.

We believe U.S. RMBS transactions backed by subprime loan collateral of all 
vintages could be adversely affected by our pending assumption changes, 
especially those transactions issued in 2005, 2006, and 2007, as they are 
collateralized by mortgage loans that are less seasoned and are more sensitive 
to current market conditions. Once we finalize our revised base surveillance 
assumptions, we will conduct a review of all outstanding RMBS to determine the 
impact of these assumptions on our outstanding ratings.

FACTORS DRIVING REVISED SURVEILLANCE METHODOLOGY
 
Monthly performance data reveals that delinquencies and foreclosures continue 
to accumulate at an increasing rate for the 2006 vintage. Since July 2007, 
cumulative losses for all subprime RMBS transactions issued during 2006 have 
increased 156% to 1.13%. The cumulative loss amount is based on the original 
balance of the transactions. At the same time, total and severe delinquencies 
(90-plus days, foreclosure, and REO) have increased 49% and 66%, respectively. 
As of the December 2007 distribution date, total delinquencies for the 2006 
vintage had increased to 28.79% and severe delinquencies were 18.83% of the 
remaining principal balance of the transactions. This delinquency trend has 
caused us to increase our expected lifetime loss projection.
 
PROJECTED VERSUS ACTUAL PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
 
On Oct. 19, 2007, Standard & Poor's incorporated new default curves into its 
surveillance process. We use the default curves to project future defaults and 
monthly losses. In order to account for the seasoning of each transaction, the 
data is reported by month of issuance. As of the December 2007 distribution 
date, foreclosures represented approximately 9.81% of the current pool balance 
for the 2006 vintage subprime collateral, which is approximately 3.4% higher 
than Standard & Poor's projection of approximately 9.49%. If defaults exceed 
our projections for an extended period of time, we may revise our loss 
projections to account for the increased credit risk. Significant revisions in 
our loss projections usually result in additional rating actions.

Although monthly foreclosures have been exceeding our default projections, 
cumulative losses have been below our expectations. As of the December 2007 
distribution date, cumulative losses represented approximately 1.13% of the 
original pool balance for the 2006 vintage subprime collateral, which is 
approximately 44% lower than Standard & Poor's projection of 1.63%. While 
monthly losses are currently coming in lower than our original projections, we 
believe that the growth in monthly losses will increase significantly in the 
upcoming months as servicers start to liquidate properties more aggressively. 
The delay in monthly losses will have a negative impact on the transactions as 
monthly excess spread, overcollateralization, and subordination are released.

ECONOMIC FACTORS
 
On a macroeconomic level, we expect the U.S. housing market, especially the 
subprime sector, will continue to decline before it improves, and we expect 
home prices will continue to come under stress. Recent industry reports reveal 
that home prices have declined by approximately 6% since the beginning of 
2006. Weakness in the property markets continues to exacerbate losses, with 
little prospect for improvement in the near term. Furthermore, we expect 
losses to continue increasing, as borrowers experience rising loan payments as 
the terms of their adjustable-rate loans reset and the principal amortization 
occurs after the interest-only period ends for both adjustable- and fixed-rate 
loans. However, we expect many of the affected borrowers to find relief 
through loan modifications that will hold initial interest rates constant for 
several years. We expect available credit enhancement to decrease as a result 
of the loan modifications. Although property values have decreased, we expect 
additional declines. David Wyss, Standard & Poor's chief economist, has 
adjusted his projection that property values will decline by 8% to 11% on 
average between 2006 and 2008, and will bottom out during mid 2008.

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confident about their investment and financial decisions. For more 
information, visit www.standardandpoors.com.


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